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Abstract 
 
 As a result of recent federal legislation, Clark County, Nevada has been 
charged with conducting a comprehensive vulnerability assessment and 
implementing a hazard mitigation policy.  This research paper identifies the 
challenges of intergovernmental relations and policy implementation, defines the 
mitigation and assessment process, and describes the steps taken by Clark 
County to date.   Definition of the legislation, emergency management, and terms 
relating to the process are provided.  Findings reveal that the attempt to 
implement a federal program in an intergovernmental arena meet predicted 
challenges and describes how these challenges have affected Clark County’s 
ability to successfully implement policy. 
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Introduction 
 
Clark County is no stranger to natural disaster.  Drought, high winds, 
extreme heat, and earthquakes are among the risks faced by those living in and 
around the Las Vegas Valley.  When disaster does strike lives are lost, property 
is destroyed, and services are interrupted.  The time and expense of recovering 
from a disaster can be immense.  Advanced technology and learning from past 
experiences allows for anticipation of and preparation for disaster, including 
natural disasters.  Through careful analysis of the risks to the population and 
infrastructure of Clark County, it is possible to reduce a disaster's effect and keep 
people and property out of harm’s way. 
Recent legislation and amendments to existing legislation have resulted in 
Clark County being required to conduct  both community vulnerability 
assessment and an all-encompassing disaster mitigation plan.  These actions, 
ordered by the US Congress’ passing of the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 
(DMA 2000) were mandated first to Nevada and then to Clark County and its 
entities.  Legislation requires that all natural hazards posing a risk to the 
population and structures of Clark County be considered in the plan.  The 
purpose of such planning is to prevent loss of human life and damage or 
destruction of structures as well as to assure that critical facilities are able to 
maintain operation and services in the event of a disaster.  Compliance with DMA 
2000 is required in order to obtain post-disaster funding through the Hazard 
Mitigation Grant Program as of November 1, 2004.   
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Comprehensive vulnerability assessment and mitigation planning are 
multi-step tasks that take a combined effort and large amount of time to 
implement.  This research focuses on the beginning steps of the vulnerability 
assessment and analyzes Clark County’s attempt to implement this portion of 
DMA 2000.  The particular method that Clark County officials chose to follow as 
well as challenges faced and progress made will be discussed.  
This paper consists of four sections.  First, a review of what existing 
literature and research reveals about coordinated intergovernmental efforts, 
policy implementation, and emergency management planning is provided.  The 
methodology utilized to date by Clark County in an effort to comply with DMA 
2000 as well as findings regarding challenges faced in attempting to implement 
DMA 2000 are then described.  Finally, future research potential is presented. 
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Review of Literature 
 
 
Policy and Program Implementation 
 
 Following the passing of a law in congress, the wheels must begin to spin 
in order for the law, whether it is a policy or a program, to be implemented.  In his 
book, The Implementation Game: What Happens After a Bill Becomes a Law, 
Eugene Bardach (Bardach, 1977) uses a metaphor to explain this process and 
the functions at work.  He compares the policy or program to a machine, created 
by a blueprint that is the legislation mandating the item that must be 
implemented.   The machine has been created to fix a problem, reduce federal 
spending and lessen the effects of disaster in the case of the Disaster Mitigation 
Act of 2000.  In order for the machine to be effective, it must be clear as to what 
the machine is supposed to do, how it is supposed to do it, and who and how it 
will serve.  If these components of the machine are not clear, implementation of 
the policy or program will become difficult as it trickles through the layers and 
agencies of government.  The original objectives of a policy are generally only a 
hint of what the actual outcome of implementation will be.  The ultimate result of 
policy depends on the method of implementation. Implementation is defined as 
those events and activities that occur after the issuing of authoritative public 
policy directives, which include both the effort to administer and the substantive 
impacts on people and events (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983).  While 
challenges faced trying to enact legislation have often times been considered 
trivial, chance, or blamed on particular circumstances, research recognizes 
repeated behaviors that occur as governments attempt effective implementation.  
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Giandomenico Majone and Aaron Wildavsky, in their article “Implementation as 
Evolution,” explain that policies are continuously transformed by implementation 
actions and that implementation consists of an altering of objectives in order to 
correspond with resources available and that acting to implement a policy 
inevitably leads to changing the policy (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983).  The 
challenges that are faced in implementing a policy often result in a pattern of 
reformation of the original “machine” as implementation occurs. 
 Challenges facing policy and program implementation include the several 
levels involved (intergovernmental relations), resources (technical, financial, and 
staffing), behaviors, agendas and priorities, decision making issues, allocation of 
financial resources from the mandating agency, attitudes and response of 
constituents, and the commitment and leadership skills of those involved in 
implementation. (Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Bardach, 1977).  These 
challenges result in major revisions to a policy, as displayed by Mazmanian and 
Sabatier (1983) in the chart below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 A policy or program is a result of a bill, which passes through congress, 
and becomes a law.  Once the law is passed, the enforcing federal agency 
begins the steps necessary to enact the law, generally assigning the task to 
agencies at the state or local level.  In the interim, the law may be subject to 
court cases, resulting in changes, should opposition to the law exist.  Once the 
Stages (Dependent Variables) in the Implementation Process 
Policy outputs of         Compliance with         Actual impacts          Major revision 
Implementing       ⇒   policy outputs by  ⇒   of policy outputs ⇒  in statute 
Agencies                      target groups 
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state and/or local levels have assumed the responsibility of implementation, the 
law is placed in the hands of particular agencies.  The director(s) of the agency 
may assume the responsibility or delegate a portion of the work to his or her 
employees and in the case of DMA 2000, collaborating agencies and the public.  
It is assumed that those involved possess an understanding of the objectives and 
purposes of the legislation.  However, interpretation and the challenges of 
implementation discussed in this section tend to lead to the altering of the original 
policy.  Legislation is often vague, leaving implementers with some uncertainty as 
to expectations as well as enabling them to read their own interpretations into the 
law (Nice, Fredericksen, 1995).  A metaphor that may be used to describe this 
issue is the child’s game of telephone.  The message changes as it is whispered 
from one child to the next until the final child reveals a message much different 
than the message whispered by the initial child.   
  Federal policies generally represent federal priority and include an 
incentive for implementation.  The priority of the federal government may not 
coincide with the priorities of the local level and incentives offered by the federal 
government may or may not entice compliance (Nice, Fredericksen 1995).  If the 
incentives are not enough to encourage compliance, the local government may 
not take the steps necessary to implement policy.  Another challenge arises after 
implementation considering the large and growing number of local governments 
making it difficult to monitor and enforce compliance.   
  Policy implementation is a political process that, due to the nature of our 
government, involves many levels of government and is subject to change along 
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the way.  Regardless of how small or large the policy at hand is, a policy will 
meet resistance and revision before it is implemented at its final destination to 
serve its intended purpose. 
 
 
Intergovernmental Relations: Coordination and Cooperation   
Federalism, defined as, “a system of government in which power is 
divided between a central authority and constituent political units,”  (American 
Heritage Dictionary, 2000) allows states the ability to make and enforce decisions 
in their given jurisdiction independent of federal involvement.  However, the 
relationship between the federal government and state governments (and their 
entities) includes a financial reliance, by states and localities, on the federal 
government and in return for financial assistance, compliance with federal 
mandates.  While financial assistance may provide incentive enough for state 
and local governments to comply, the federal government may also wield the 
power of the Supremacy Clause.  Although states do possess and cling tightly to 
specified powers, this clause typically makes those laws outlined by the United 
States Constitution and federal legislation superior to state and local laws.  If a 
state or local government contradicts legislative action at the federal level, the 
legislation at the federal level may preempt the state or local legislation under the 
Supremacy Clause, requiring compliance with federal mandate (AP Government, 
2003). 
 As previously stated, mandates are often times attached to incentives and 
often come in the form of federal grants or loans.  During the 1960’s the federal 
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system underwent a transformation including the number of federal grant-in-aid 
programs increasing.  As more and more communities increased their 
dependence on federal funding, the federal government increased their 
involvement in community affairs and policy making.  Federal aid expenditures 
grew from $4,935 million in 1958 to $25,029 million in 1970.  This amount has 
continued to grow, with the United States Census Bureau reporting 
intergovernmental revenue to be $291,949,750 billion in 1999-2000 (US Census 
Bureau, State and Local Government Finance). Due to the origin of the money 
being federal programs, federal supervision and control are part of the package.  
Federal programs, such as those created to fight poverty in the Economic 
Opportunity Act of 1964, had a national purpose.  Issues arose when the national 
purpose contradicted the local purpose and priorities, but national purposes 
tended to take precedence when a financial incentive was attached (O’Toole, 
1993). Not only did the federal government mandate how their money must be 
spent, measures were also set in place to monitor spending and assure that 
money allotted to the states for a specific purpose was in fact spent in the 
manner intended and not on a local priority.  This system of “carrots and sticks” 
continues today with the idea that federal money meaning compliance with 
federal priorities and non-compliance resulting in a loss of funding. 
 The restructuring of federal support and reliance that occurred during the 
1960’s allowed federal agencies to pick and choose which state and local 
agencies they wished to work with and the conditions under which funding would 
be provided.  In some cases federal administrators chose to charge existing 
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agencies with federal mandates while other cases resulted in the creation of new 
agencies specific to the purpose at hand. 
 With the increased involvement of the federal government in state and 
local affairs came a debate over which type of federalism the United States was 
modeling, cooperative or dual federalism.  In dual federalism, the state and 
federal governments possess separate and independent powers.  Cooperative 
federalism, which more closely defines the post-1960’s transformation system, 
results in greater shared responsibility and levels relying upon each other in part 
to survive and succeed (O’Toole, Jr. 1993).  Argument exists that federal 
government powers extending or intermingling with local governments leads to 
the weakening of the local government.  Eisenhower, while running for president, 
advocated for the preservation of state and local control in order to maintain the 
foundation upon which our country was built.  While a case does exist for federal 
intervention and the promotion of a national purpose and comprehensive policy, 
just a strong of case exists for the maintaining of local authority. 
 Not long after the federal government became a regular player in state 
and local government, it was realized that cooperation and coordination problems 
existed.  Grant-in-aid programs were developed with a program approach, 
treating each program or incentive as an independent case.  This resulted in the 
lack of a master or strategic plan, confusion, and lack of coordination between 
government levels and agencies.  It became difficult to determine which agencies 
took precedence when contradiction of interests arose and became clear that if 
coordination was to become a reality in the community, a need exists for 
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someone to be able to say that when inter-agency conflict occurs, one practice or 
project is to prevail over another (O’Toole, Jr. 1993).    In an attempt to improve 
coordination between agencies and levels of government, policy makers chose a 
system of mutual adjustment, which promotes negotiation among agencies that 
are considered equal instead of a system of central direction, which would have 
created more of a hierarchical system.  This action was taken when it became 
clear that coordination and cooperation among intergovernmental agencies was 
not an easy task. 
 While the focus turned to improving cooperation and coordination in an 
effort to make government processes smoother, the effort to do so instead 
resulted in additional layers of government as more players became involved.  
Beyond the federal, state, and local governments, counties, towns and 
townships, neighborhoods, and new agencies were among groups and 
governments desiring a role in policy and decision-making.  The rise in the 
number of individuals and agendas involved in carrying out federal programs 
created a need for competent leaders with the ability to plan, initiate, and 
coordinate effectively (Sundquist, James and Davis 1969).  Federal programs are 
reliant on strong leadership and structured community institutions.     In order to 
assure the success of the mandate, a community must have available the 
necessary resources and be willing to commit them to the project at hand.  If 
cooperation is expected, the agency charged with facilitating the implementation 
process must possess the respect of the cooperating agencies and should not 
hold a competitive interest in the matter. 
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Emergency Management, Definitions 
 
Mankind has faced natural disaster and devastation throughout time, 
responding and rebuilding as damage occurs.  Realizing that simply responding 
to a disaster was not enough and seeking a more pro-active approach, the 
1990’s were declared the International Decade for Natural Disaster Reduction.  
This proclamation called for an anticipation of natural disasters and a reduction of 
their effects through hazard mitigation.  Mitigation, defined as, “advanced actions 
to lessen the impact of disaster on social and built environments,” became an 
important step in comprehensive emergency management (Drabeck, Thomas 
and Hoetmer 1991).  Mitigation goes a step further than simply being prepared 
for a disaster as mitigation efforts strive to reduce the impact of a disaster 
through structural and non-structural actions. Adding mitigation to the process 
resulted in four phases of emergency management; preparedness, response, 
recovery, and mitigation.  While this research focuses on the mitigation phase, it 
is important that the remaining phases be identified as all phases are set into 
motion by a disaster and overlap each other.  These phases, presented in the 
following order by International City Manager’s Association, are the four phases 
of comprehensive emergency management (Drabeck and Hoetmer, 1991). 
 Preparedness: Action taken prior to a disaster occurring to develop the 
plans and systems of emergency operations and emergency management. 
 
 Response: Action taken immediately before, during, and directly after a 
disaster.  The purpose of response is to minimize personal injury and damage 
through emergency functions.  Emergency functions may include warning 
systems, evacuation, search and rescue, and providing food, shelter, and 
medical services. 
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 Recovery:  Occurs immediately after a disaster strikes and includes the 
efforts to restore services in the area affected and bring community back to a 
normal state.  Recovery activities may include damage assessment, removing 
debris, and restoring supply of necessary survival items.  Recovery also has a 
long-term component, which includes the creation of mitigation plans based upon 
the events of the recent disaster. 
 
 Mitigation: Mitigation may take place as a result of a prior disaster that is 
likely to re-occur or in anticipation of a different type of disaster.  The purpose of 
mitigation is to reduce risk through planning for a disaster and may include 
evaluating and planning land use, creation of management plans in areas at risk, 
relocation or strengthening of structures in harms way, implementing codes and 
policy, and educating the public. 
 
Although acts mandating hazard mitigation planning are drafted and passed at 
the federal level and directed first to the states and then to individual localities 
within each state, it is at the local level that planning must occur.  Mitigation plans 
are specific to the types of hazards that pose a risk to individual communities and 
the infrastructure located within.  Therefore, specific planning must occur at the 
local level and extend upward in an effort to create a comprehensive national 
disaster hazard mitigation program.  Officials must follow three steps in this 
process; identification, analysis, and strategy preparation. (Drabeck and 
Hoetmer, 1991)  In identifying hazards posing a threat to their community, 
officials should consider all potential hazards and their characteristics, the 
locations at which they have historically occurred and are likely to occur again, 
the probability of occurrence or re-occurrence, the impact on livelihood and 
property, and what actions are currently underway to reduce damage from the 
identified hazard.  Analysis must include analyzing risks in the event of the 
disaster occurring, the vulnerability of the population and property of the 
community to injury or damage, and estimated economic loss.  Strategy 
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preparation includes preparing the plans, recommending plans for approval, and 
maintaining and updating plans as necessary (Drabeck and Hoetmer 1991). 
     While mitigation efforts may be applied to natural or man-made disasters, 
DMA 2000 requires only natural hazard mitigation which would include damage 
caused by floods, hurricanes, tornadoes, earthquakes, soil problems, winds, or 
any other damage that occurs as a result of a force of nature.  People and 
property are affected by such hazards and mitigation takes both into 
consideration, prioritizing first human life and second property. 
 Two forms of mitigation actions exist, structural and non-structural.  
Structural mitigation actions strive to contain or lessen the effects of a hazard 
through the use of actual, physical structure.  When attempting to mitigate 
disaster by use of structural efforts a focus is given to strengthening exposed 
infrastructure to withstand the effects of a disaster. Examples of structural 
mitigation include building dams or dikes to prevent flooding or relocating 
buildings directly in harms way.  Non-structural mitigation involves a policy 
approach and includes such actions as adopting and enforcing codes and 
regulations, acquiring land that is considered at risk to prevent unsafe usage, and 
providing preferential taxation and insurance rates based on a property owner’s 
proximity to the hazard risk area.  
  In order to effectively assess community vulnerability, officials on the local, 
state, and federal levels must work together and offer both financial and 
personnel resources.   Local emergency management officials generally lead the 
effort to assess vulnerability and implement mitigation and often times face 
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resistance for various reasons.  These reasons include costs, time, personnel 
commitment, and contradiction of priorities.  The outcome of plans generally 
result in regulations or programs that not all participants agree with, making 
decision making difficult.   Public, private, and non-profit agencies must 
participate in order to create a comprehensive vulnerability assessment and 
mitigation plan.  A further challenge to the process of mitigation is the fact that, 
due to growth and changes in population and infrastructure, plans must be 
updated regularly.  Emergency Managers must face resistance and promote   
mitigation by educating the community on its benefits.   These officials must be 
able to convince community leaders, policy makers, and the public that while 
expenses are incurred and sacrifices are made, the benefit of mitigating disaster 
outweighs the costs.  The case must be made that preventing disaster saves 
lives and property and costs less than repeatedly recovering from disaster.   
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Methodology: The Vulnerability Assessment Process and Mitigation 
Planning Undergone by Clark County, to Date 
  In order to comply with the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000, the state of 
Nevada and Clark County has begun the chore of assessing vulnerability and 
planning mitigation efforts.   During this portion of the paper, focus will be given   
to the vulnerability assessment steps taken thus far (steps one through three) 
and the progress made since the implementation process began during the 
summer of 2002.  Discussion will include the model Clark County is following and 
the steps involved, progress made to date, participating individuals and agencies 
and their roles, and what the county is yet to achieve to complete implementation 
requirements.   
 
Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 
In an effort to curb the disaster-repair-disaster cycle and reduce federal 
spending in the area of emergency response, congress passed the Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000 on October 30, 2000 (Public Law 106-390).  This act 
amends the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 
1988 and sets into place a requirement for state, local, and tribal governments to 
create and implement hazard mitigation plans.  The primary goal of this 
legislation is to identify where hazards are occurring and re-occurring, where 
disaster funds are being spent, and what steps can and will be taken to mitigate 
the effects of the disaster.  Ultimately, DMA 2000 aims to establish a national 
disaster hazard mitigation program in order to reduce the number of lives as well 
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as structures lost   Plans are required to be submitted for review by January 30, 
2004 and as an incentive to create and implement pre-disaster plans, the federal 
government has ordered that states without such plans will not be eligible for 
hazard mitigation funding (post-disaster relief) beyond this date. 
 The verbatim definition of the act includes “to authorize a program for 
predisaster mitigation, to streamline the administration of disaster relief, to control 
the Federal costs of disaster assistance, and for other purposes” (DMA 2000). 
DMA 2000 focuses on natural disasters and requires states to identify and 
assess hazards that pose a risk to their community.  The act requires localities to 
consider historical damage in their area.  Specifically, hazards that have 
repeatedly caused damage in a given area and the area affected by the given 
hazard are to be targeted to prevent repeat damage.  Beyond preventing 
avoidable damage to property and loss of life, the act states that planning should 
also assure that critical services and facilities, such as government buildings and 
emergency response, are able to maintain operation in the event of a disaster.  
 
Implementing DMA 2000 in Clark County, Nevada 
The Clark County Office of Emergency Management has been assigned 
the task of carrying out Clark County’s vulnerability assessment and mitigation 
planning. The ultimate goal of this effort is the creation of a comprehensive local 
mitigation plan.  The purpose of the resulting plan is to represent Clark County’s 
“commitment to reduce risks from natural hazards, serving as a guide for 
decision makers as they commit resources to reducing the effects of natural 
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hazards” (DMA 2000).  In order to assure an all-encompassing plan, it is required 
that all communities within Clark County as well as local and regional agencies in 
the county be involved in the assessment and planning stages.  Further, 
business owners, private and non-profit agencies, stakeholders, and the general 
public are required to be allowed to have an input opportunity.  
 
Guidelines 
The Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000 did not provide a tutorial or step-by-
step process that planning teams are required to follow.  Instead, guidelines have 
been provided and communities are allowed some choice in the means by which 
they will produce the necessary final product.  By allowing localities the freedom 
to choose the process or model that best fit their particular community and 
resources, the federal government has provided localities with ownership of their 
assessment and planning process. Guidelines state that the plan must include 
documentation of who was involved (public and private) in the planning process 
and the process undergone to develop the plan.  A risk assessment, identifying 
and prioritizing hazards that pose a risk to Clark County, is the first required step.  
This assessment (also referred to as vulnerability assessment) is to include a 
summary of each hazard identified and the potential impact of each particular 
hazard.  Clark County, due to its political make-up, opted to create a multi-
jurisdictional plan.  Therefore, risk assessment is required to identify risks to the 
entire county.  Following the risk assessment step, a mitigation strategy is 
required to be decided upon based on reducing the risks of hazards identified 
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during risk assessment.  The strategy section must to include a description of 
mitigation goals to reduce vulnerabilities, identification and analysis of mitigation 
policy in place or in the works, and an action plan prioritizing and explaining 
implementation and administration actions.  Once the plan is completed, a 
maintenance plan must also be established to assure monitoring, evaluating, and 
updating the mitigation plan every five years (Code of Federal Regulations, Title 
44). 
 Upon completion of the risk assessment and mitigation plan, the entire 
document will be submitted first to the state and then to the FEMA Regional 
Office for review and approval.    
 
Steps taken by Clark County 
  Clark County managers stepped up to face the task of complying 
with DMA 2000.  Jim O’Brien, Manager of the Clark County Office of Emergency 
Management, recognized that accomplishing the assessment portion of the act 
would be the most straightforward if a tutorial were followed.  After reviewing 
several available plans and tutorials specific to risk assessment on the internet, 
Mr. O’Brien chose to model Clark County’s vulnerability assessment after the 
North Carolina Vulnerability Assessment Tutorial (the tutorial).  The Department 
of Commerce’s National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) 
Coastal Services Center developed this tutorial’s methodology. This operational 
template was chosen in part because it implemented and relied upon the use of a 
Geographic Information System (GIS) to store, map, and analyze data.  The GIS 
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Department of Clark County, offering a mature collection of data to assist in the 
completion of the tutorial, became an influential participant in the assessment 
and planning process. 
 The NOAA tutorial outlines seven steps in a vulnerability assessment.  
The steps are hazard identification, hazard analysis, critical facilities analysis, 
societal analysis, economic analysis, environmental analysis, and mitigation 
opportunities analysis.  Within each of the seven steps exist sub-steps to be 
completed sequentially and build upon each other.  Steps and sub-steps are 
displayed below.  
Step 1-Hazard Identification   
 1a: Identify Hazards 
 1b: Establish relative priorities for your hazards 
 
Step 2-Hazard Analysis 
 2a: Map risk consideration areas for hazards. 
 2b: Assign scores within risk consideration areas, where possible. 
 
Step 3-Critical Facilities Analysis 
 3a: Identify critical facilities categories. 
 3b: Complete a critical facilities inventory. 
 3c: Identify intersections of critical facilities with high-risk areas. 
 3d: Conduct vulnerability assessment on all critical facilities. 
 
Step 4-Societal Analysis 
 4a: Identify areas of special consideration. 
 4b: Identify intersections of special consideration areas with high-risk   
                 areas. 
 4c: Conduct a general inventory of special consideration/high-risk  
                 locations. 
 
Step 5-Economic Analysis 
 5a: Identify primary economic sectors and locate economic centers. 
 5b: Identify intersection of economic centers and high-risk areas. 
 5c: Conduct general inventory of high-risk economic centers. 
 5d: Identify large employers and their intersection with hazard risk areas. 
 5e: Conduct vulnerability analysis on structures of large employers as  
                 critical facilities. 
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Step 6-Environmental Analysis 
 6a: Identify secondary hazard risk consideration sites and key  
                 environmental resource sites. 
 6b: Identify intersections of secondary risk sites, environmentally sensitive 
       areas, and natural hazard risk consideration areas. 
 6c: Identify key environmental resource locations and their proximity to 
       secondary risk sites. 
 6d: Conduct vulnerability analysis on priority secondary risk sites as  
       critical facilities. 
 
Step 7-Mitigation Opportunities Analysis 
 7a: Identify areas of undeveloped land and their intersection with high-risk           
                 areas. 
 7b: Inventory high-risk undeveloped land. 
 7c: Assess the status of your existing flood insurance program  
                 participation. 
 
 The first step was to identify the hazards posing a threat to Clark County.  
The first sub-step of the hazard identification process consisted of introductory 
and brainstorming sessions held on July 15th and August 12th, 2002 during which 
participants defined vulnerability (susceptible to physical or emotional injury) and 
created a comprehensive list of threats and vulnerabilities within Clark County.  
Officials representing Clark County, Boulder City, North Las Vegas, the 
University of Nevada, Las Vegas, City of Las Vegas, City of Mesquite, and City of 
Henderson attended this meeting.  This meeting resulted in two lists, natural and 
human (man-made) risks. 
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Natural 
Wind (dust, high wind, traffic) 
Flood (Dam failure and river flood) 
Flash Floods 
Tornado 
Earthquake 
Drought 
Wildfire 
Severe Weather (Microburst?, Lightning, Heat) 
Avalanche and Slides 
Volcanic Ash 
Natural Epidemic 
Invasive Species 
  
 
Human (Man-made) 
Aircraft Crash 
Civil Disturbance 
Dam Failure 
Explosives 
Fire  
Fuel Storage 
Utility Failure 
Hazmat Disaster 
Radiologic (High and low level) 
Water System Failure 
Transportation System  
Terrorism 
Pipelines 
Communication 
Mines 
Landfill 
 
Recognizing that the meeting did not include complete representation, a 
follow-up memo was sent to “partners in public safety” inviting further input and 
providing information on the process. 
Once hazards presenting threat to Clark County were identified, the next 
step was to prioritize risks in order to decide which hazards posed the greatest 
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threat and should be focused upon as a part of the mitigation plan.  In order to 
weigh each hazard against the others, the tutorial provided a formula to apply to 
each hazard.  This formula took into account the frequency at which the hazard 
has occurred in the past, the area impacted when the disaster does occur, and 
the magnitude.  Frequency was scored in terms of time, area of impact 
categorized as either the entire county, a township/range block, census tract, 
block group, or site (x,y coordinate), and magnitude ranged from federal disaster   
to a specific, insured loss.  Below is the formula followed and scoring rubric. 
(Frequency + Area of Impact) x Magnitude=Total Score 
  
Frequency Area of Impact Magnitude 
Score       
1 10+ years Site (x,y) Insured Loss 
2 6-9 years Block Group Local 
3 1-5 years Census Tract State 
4 2-12 months Township, Range Federal Emergency 
5 0-30 days County Federal Disaster 
 
Decisions were made by the collaborating group as to what score to assign each 
hazard in each category.  The group referred to Office of Emergency 
Management historical records to determine frequency and magnitude scores.   
After each hazard was assessed, the formula produced the following scores. 
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  After scores were assigned to each disaster, the team used the scores as 
a tool to prioritize risks and decide which risks would be focused upon during the 
vulnerability and mitigation planning process.  Scores ranged from a total score 
of six in the case of structural fires to 40 in the case of a natural epidemic.  
Statistical analysis resulted in the following scores:  
 
  
Natural Hazards Human Caused Disasters 
Mean 23 18
Median 21.5 17
Mode 18 12
 
Because time limitations prevented the option of analyzing each hazard, the 
team decided upon a cut-off score of 25.  Hazards scoring 25 or higher would be 
assessed and included in planning, and hazards scoring 24 or lower would not 
be focused upon during this process.  The final selection included drought, 
Natural Hazards Score 
Avalanche/Slides 8
Drought  28
Earthquake 25
Epidemic 40
Flash Flood 32
Flood 25
Invasive Species 18
Severe Weather 18
Tornado 14
Volcanic Ash 18
Wildfire 32
Wind 18
Human Hazards Score 
Aircraft Crash 12
Civil Disturbance 20
Communications Infrastructure 16
Dam Failure 30
Epidemic (Bio-Terror) 25
Explosives 10
Fuel Storage Disruption 24
Gang Activity 14
Hazardous Materials (HazMat) 14
Mines 8
Pipelines 18
Radiologic (Low-level waste) 28
Structural Fire 6
Terrorism Threats 12
Transportation Systems 24
Utility Failure 27
Waste Treatment 21
Water System Failure 28
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earthquake, natural epidemic, flash flood, flood, and wildfire in the natural hazard 
category and dam failure, bio-terror epidemic, utility failure, and water system 
failure in the human-caused category.  The creation of this list satisfied step 1b, 
establishment of priorities for identified hazards and thus completed step 1. 
 Analysis of the identified hazards was the goal of step two.  This step 
included GIS as a major component as the first sub-step was mapping the risk 
consideration areas.  The purpose of this step was to target the priority areas on 
which to focus.  Existing county GIS files as well as data acquired from 
appropriate agencies were utilized in order to map hazards as they had 
historically occurred within Clark County.  An attempt was made to collect data 
that best represented historical disaster occurrence and damage.  In some 
cases, and as was noted in the tutorial, there were limitations to existing data and 
analysis was forced to be based upon what data was available.   Several data 
files were outdated or were originally created for an independent project and then 
forgotten.  For example, a file of earthquake faults included only those faults in 
the central portion of the Las Vegas Valley and did not include the outlying, but 
potentially vulnerable, areas.  Because this is ultimately a Clark County project, 
access to Clark County GIS data is unlimited, but data from other entities 
depends on their cooperation and the quality of their data.   In creating maps, it 
became a case of the maps being only as accurate or current as the information 
provided.   Data collection involved communicating with officials from such 
agencies as the Bureau of Land Management, Bureau of Reclamation, and 
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Regional Flood Control and relied heavily upon communication and making the 
correct contacts. 
 Once data was compiled and ready to be mapped, it became necessary to 
create region boundaries.  Boundary options discussed included township/range 
blocks, commission districts, and regions created solely for the purpose of risk 
mapping.  Ultimately, five regions dividing the county were created using existing 
and practical boundaries (see Appendix A).  Interstates 15 and 95 as well as 
Highway 93 served as boundary lines as did state and county lines.  Gaps in 
boundaries were resolved by extending existing lines to close each region.  This 
process was completed using GIS, resulting in a shapefile, a GIS map file, 
displaying five regions dividing Clark County. 
  Following the mapping of hazards and the creation of a power point 
presentation to allow analysis and scoring, a meeting was held to attempt to 
assign scores to each consideration area (region).  A copy of this presentation, 
including maps, can be found in Appendix B.  This meeting, held February 11th, 
2003, was attended by individuals representing the City of Las Vegas Emergency 
Management and GIS departments, the State of Nevada Division of Emergency 
Management, Boulder City Emergency Management, Clark County Emergency 
Management and GIS Management Office (GISMO), North Las Vegas 
Emergency Management, the Las Vegas Fire Department, and the University of 
Nevada, Las Vegas (UNLV) Environmental Studies Program.  Representation by 
other agencies and individuals had been encouraged as well. 
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 Two scoring rubrics were presented following the presentation of mapped 
hazards in an attempt to assign scores, per hazard, to each region (see 
Appendix C and D).  The goal of this step was to identify which regions obtained 
the greatest risk for each hazard and where to focus assessment and mitigation 
efforts.  Discussion included what factors to consider, as the tutorial did not 
specify an exact scoring process.  This meeting did not result in assigned scores, 
as there was confusion as to the most appropriate method to use.   It became 
evident that it was difficult to consider hazards independent of their locations or 
the populations affected by an event.  Questions also arose in regards to whether 
or not an area that did not cause loss of life or structure or economic damage 
should be considered priority.  An example of this was the difficulty in comparing 
an area of extreme flood danger that was not populated to a heavily populated 
area with low or moderate flood danger.  Attendees could not find sense in 
assigning the unpopulated area a higher score, yet the particular step of the 
tutorial did not consider such situations.  The meeting adjourned with the 
understanding that further analysis would need to occur prior to scores being 
assigned. 
 In an effort to understand the most effective means of scoring, the input of 
Dr. David Hassenzahl, an assistant professor in Environmental Studies at UNLV 
and active participant in the planning process, was requested.  During a meeting 
with Dr. Hassenzahl, discussion suggested that criteria be developed per hazard 
to allow scoring each hazard independently, rather than attempting to rank 
hazards using identical criteria.  Two options were discussed.   The first was 
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creating criteria specific to each hazard, such as flooding.  Regions might be 
placed in categories such as falls within 500-year flood zone, falls within 100-
year flood zone, region does not contain flood zones.  The second option, which 
Dr. Hassenzahl presented in a paper titled “White Paper for the Clark County GIS 
Vulnerability Assessment Project: Looking Ahead, Designing Mitigation, and 
Managing Uncertainty,” utilized the FEMA threshold for assistance, which states 
that a disaster must incur a cost of $2.50 per person in an impacted area in order 
to justify federal assistance.  Using this method would result in evaluating costs 
based on assessments of land and structure value and assessing damage by the 
cost incurred to respond and repair.  Regions with a higher assessed value 
would then be considered more at risk and be focused on as priority. 
 
Cost per person Score 
$2.50+ 5 
$2.01-2.49 4 
$1.51-2.00 3 
$1.01-1.50 2 
$0-1.00 1 
  
While agreeing that the FEMA threshold was the best-fit scoring rubric to use, 
hazards have not been scored using this method to date.  Time limitations and 
the lack of individuals with risk management expertise or experience has put this 
step temporary on hold.  In order to best utilize current resources, efforts have 
instead been focused on step three, with an intention of and need to return to 
step two.   
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 Step three, creating an inventory and maps of critical facilities, is currently 
underway.  Facilities being considered critical include those facilities providing 
services necessary for responding to a disaster and allowing for the continued 
operation of infrastructure.  Completing this step has involved referring to the 
tutorial, creating a comprehensive list of critical facilities within Clark County, 
collecting the necessary information regarding each facility, and mapping critical 
facilities using GIS in order to identify their intersections with high-risk areas.  
Information has been gathered through accessing county records and consulting 
with individuals from the agencies representing the particular facilities.  An 
inventory consisting of all critical facilities, their facility type, name, address, 
owner or operator, phone number(s), and contacts will serve as an important and 
required product of the vulnerability assessment (see Appendix E for a sample 
inventory).   
 Upon completion of the inventory and mapping, representatives from 
participating agencies will once again be brought together to conduct a 
vulnerability assessment on all critical facilities.  This will allow for the 
identification of critical facilities that may be poorly located (in harm’s way) or 
may require measures to be taken to lessen the effects of a disaster on the 
critical facility and its ability to provide services.  Beyond allowing for a 
vulnerability assessment though, this step also produces and important resource 
to be utilized in the event of disaster.  To date, this is as far as the process has 
progressed in the tutorial.  It is expected that step three will be completed in May 
2003, allowing officials to continue on to steps four through seven. 
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Structural and Non-Structural Mitigation in Place 
 While assessing vulnerability has been a goal thus far, another step of the 
process has also been underway. Prior to the development of a mitigation plan, 
current policy must be analyzed.  In an effort to understand current mitigation 
policies in place as well as identify mitigation opportunity in Clark County, a 
spreadsheet was created for each hazard being evaluated.  This spreadsheet 
includes several measures in both the structural and non-structural categories.  
Structural mitigation measures include action taken to strengthen structures, 
containment of hazard, and relocation of facilities in harm’s way.  Non-structural 
mitigation measures include statutes and ordinances, regulatory actions, and 
capital improvement programs.  Representatives from the agencies most related 
to each hazard were contacted and provided information specific to their agency.  
Existing documentation, including existing in-house vulnerability assessments, 
were reviewed and referenced.  This process is on going and will result in a 
comprehensive narrative of mitigation policy currently in place in Clark County.  
Individuals working on the process hope to use this document to identify 
opportunities for further mitigation measures in Clark County.  Once gaps in 
policy and opportunities are identified, the appropriate agencies may increase or 
implement policy in the necessary areas. 
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Research Findings: 
 Challenges Facing Implementation of DMA 2000 in Clark County, Nevada 
 
 Implementing a new policy is not a simple task.  Review of existing 
literature and research suggested that the process of implementing the Disaster 
Mitigation Act of 2000 and its provisions would meet the predicted challenges of 
policy implementation in the intergovernmental arena.  These challenges 
included communication issues, time restraints, budget constraints, and conflict 
of priority and agenda.  Further, the classic issues surrounding federalism have 
appeared during this process.  Because this is an intergovernmental effort, 
agencies and departments are expected to work together.  However, it was the 
Office of Emergency Management that was charged with the task, resulting of 
course in this agency being the most concerned with the completion of the task.  
The agencies not directly charged with the project, yet expected to provide 
necessary input and man hours, are naturally not as motivated.  
The federal government has wielded its power over the state and 
threatened the loss of federal dollars if localities do not comply.  The agencies 
and individuals attempting this process have clearly needed a motivating factor to 
complete implementation considering the commitment required.  However, the 
question arises as to whether or not the threat of lost resources is enough to 
entice compliance or if another factor is resulting in compliance.  Throughout the 
process, skepticism has existed as to whether or not the federal government 
would really withhold post-disaster funding if Clark County did not meet the 
requirements of DMA 2000 in time.  It is difficult to believe that the federal 
government would not provide funding in the event of a natural disaster that 
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caused loss of human life or a large level of property damage.  This suggests 
that the system of federal incentives may not be effective standing alone and that 
greater underlying motivators must be present. 
 Regardless of the incentive and Clark County’s response to the potential 
loss of funds, Clark County has shown obvious intent to comply in that the 
process is moving forward.  Time, money, and personnel have been dedicated to 
this project for a year and documentation of progress exists.  While the federal 
mandate can be attributed to some level of compliance, other factors are 
motivating compliance as well.  Discussion at meetings has revealed not only 
gaps in current mitigation policy, but also a desire for the existence of a more 
comprehensive document.  Local decision makers recognize that specific areas 
in Clark County lack policy to protect them from historically occurring hazards.  
An example of this exists in the case of Mt. Charleston, a rural community in a 
heavily wooded area of the county.  Mt. Charleston is vulnerable to wildfire and 
yet very few regulatory measures are in place to prevent the start or spread of 
wildfire.  Further, only one route exists as a means of escape from the area in the 
event of a disaster.  Perhaps these gaps in policy and measures are due to a 
conflict of priorities or a lack of resources.  Regardless, bringing individuals 
together and analyzing policy as a team has resulted in a greater awareness and 
has been a step forward in making Clark County a safer place to live.  Thus, the 
desire to safeguard our communities and residents may in fact be considered a 
motivator for compliance.  An additional motivating factor is professional 
reputation.  Those charged with leading the project, specifically the director of the 
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Clark County Office of Emergency Management, have a reputation to uphold in 
completing the assigned and expected tasks of their position. 
 In order for progress towards successful implementation to occur, those 
involved in the process are required to possess a clear understanding of the 
objectives.  One challenge in effectively implementing the provisions of DMA 
2000 has been confusion in regards to the objectives.  A clear format to follow 
does not exist and the steps are not outlined.  In the case of Clark County, the 
individual assigned the task of advancing the project did not have an emergency 
management or mitigation background, making the learning curve steep.  
Without an initial understanding of the objectives, it became difficult to move 
forward as a lack of sense of direction existed.  As the task of completing the 
necessary steps has made its way from the mandate itself through the layers of 
government and into the hands of those responsible for the specific steps, 
confusion has occurred as to how to carry out the process.  DMA 2000 provides 
a purpose, but lacks specific methodology.  While there is some benefit to a lack 
of mandated methodology (freedom and utilizing a means that best fits a 
particular community), the lack of guidelines have made the process at times 
frustrating for individuals not possessing experience in such a project.  A large 
amount of literature and policy in the area of disaster mitigation exists, making 
concrete interpretation and understanding of expectations difficult.  Because the 
planning was assigned to existing agencies in lieu of creating an agency specific 
to mitigation planning, the assessment and plan became an additional 
responsibility for agencies possessing and focused on their own priorities.  A lack 
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of time and personnel as well as agency-related objectives taking precedence 
over DMA 2000 objectives has made the process of implementation slow. 
 As described in the literature review, priorities stifle implementation.  
Several agencies on federal, state, county, and city levels have been involved in 
Clark County’s vulnerability assessment.  Naturally, individuals representing their 
agency tend to prioritize their specific agency’s mission.  An example of this has 
occurred when state mitigation planning meetings have centered on earthquake 
mitigation as a result of the Earthquake Safety agency having large 
representation.  Over representation (or over zealous representation) in one area 
and under representation (or non-enthusiastic representation) in another area 
may result in misrepresentation of the risk of specific disaster.  Clark County has 
been very careful in assuring that all hazards are considered and each hazard 
has appropriate representation. 
 Communication has posed another hurdle to implementation.  Due to the 
nature of the information required to be documented, agencies are skeptical to 
share sensitive or protected information.  For example, the Las Vegas Valley 
Water District complied with a request for information, but was unable to share 
specific details of their operations for security reasons.  Many details relating to 
hazard mitigation include secure information and, considering the current state of 
our nation and recent breaches in security, officials are reluctant to share 
sensitive or secure information.  The Clark County Disaster Mitigation Plan will 
be published by FEMA upon completion.  While sensitive material will only be 
referenced and not published, the number of individuals involved in planning 
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makes sharing sensitive material a risk in itself.  The intergovernmental nature of 
this project in itself has stifled communication.  Different entities work different 
schedules making coordination of communication difficult.  Often times 
messages were not replied to, perhaps due to miscommunication, failure to relay 
messages, or returning a call in regards to mitigation a low priority.   
 Ownership of risk had to be alleviated while mapping hazards.  The 
tutorial followed suggested using township/range blocks for mapping purposes.  
However, the size of Clark County and the large number of township/range 
blocks made this method impractical.  Other options considered were mapping 
using current incorporated boundaries and the unincorporated land of Clark 
County or commission districts.  Choosing either of these methods would have 
resulted in political ownership of hazards, potentially creating animosity or 
skewed policy.  Instead, officials chose to create five non-political regions that did 
not follow any political boundaries.   
 The size of government in Clark County has presented a challenge as 
well.  Clark County consists of several cities as well as a government of its own.  
Further, state and federal agencies have jurisdiction in the county and their land 
and policies must be considered.  A comprehensive collection of data has been 
required and the number of agencies to contact and include have made this 
process difficult.  Again, each of these agencies and offices has their own 
missions and responding to requests for mitigation policy has proven to not be 
priority.  Agencies also compete for funding and naturally consider their mission 
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to take precedence over the missions of others, causing communication and 
representation issues. 
 The deadline for compliance has also been a factor influencing progress.  
The original deadline was extended a year, perhaps creating the idea that ample 
time existed to complete the plan and allowing more urgent tasks to become 
priority.  Therefore, planning efforts have been to be slowed, removing 
momentum from the process. 
 Perhaps the largest obstacle or roadblock to smooth implementation has 
been the fact that local governments are expected to work together.  While an 
incentive was offered and funding provided for the planning process, these 
factors are not influential to all parties expected to participate.  While the 
community as a whole will benefit from vulnerability assessment and mitigation 
planning (through less damage during a disastrous event), a tangible reason to 
become involved or offer resources does not exist.  Agencies approached and 
asked to make a commitment naturally see this process as another task being 
added to an already busy schedule.  Some agencies have jumped on the 
bandwagon, enthusiastically offering input and providing resources, while others 
have failed to participate or offer input.  This has resulted in over representation 
in some cases and under representation in others, preventing a truly 
comprehensive plan from emerging from the process.  As is typical, those with an 
agenda are more apt to become involved for the advancement of their cause, 
leaving those issues less represented (but perhaps just as urgent) left out.  As 
discussed by Mazmanian and Sabatier, the product resulting from 
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implementation is dependant on those involved and may vary drastically 
depending on which agencies are represented.  This fact reiterates the 
importance of inviting input from stakeholders at all levels in order to ensure an 
equal opportunity for representation as well as a comprehensive document. 
 Clark County is encountering typical hurdles as they attempt to assess 
vulnerability and implement the Disaster Mitigation Act of 2000.  Progress is 
being made and a greater understanding of objectives is occurring, but issues of 
policy implementation and intergovernmental relations will continue to surface as 
the mitigation planning process advances.   
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Conclusion 
 Much work still remains in the completion of a disaster mitigation plan for 
Clark County.  While this research has focused on the vulnerability assessment 
and beginning steps of planning, several steps are yet to be taken.  Further 
research and work will include continuing through the steps outlined by the 
tutorial and collecting existing mitigation policy.  Research opportunities include 
analyzing maps as well as gaps in existing policy and opportunities to improve 
policy and reduce risks.  During this process, Clark County may choose to refer 
to the planning process followed by other localities as models and incorporate 
their own method as well. 
 Having not analyzed the progress of other counties or localities, it is 
impossible to state where in the process Clark County is compared to other 
areas.  Clark County has continued to make progress, regardless of the 
challenges and obstacles being met.  Considering the desires of the leadership in 
the Clark County Office of Emergency Management, GISMO, and the 
Emergency Management offices of the individual cities, it is predicted that a plan 
will be completed as mandated.  While compliance will result in a guarantee of 
federal dollars to assist in response to disaster, the more valued outcomes may 
be increased communication and the existence of a comprehensive mitigation 
document.  Overall, Clark County residents will benefit in that their lives and 
property will be more protected in the event of a disaster. 
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